Thoughts on China

The Trial of Major General Xu Qinxian

Wed, 10 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000

A 6-hour video from the trial of PLA Major General Xu Qinxian (徐勤先), Commander of the 38th Group Army during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, was publicized by the group Human Rights in China in late November 2025. Xu was tried for refusing to follow orders to use force against civilian protesters in Beijing.

A Chinese-language transcript of the video was posted on December 1 on the 鹿津出版社 blog. This is a machine translation of that transcript; there may be errors or omissions. I used the “gemini-3-pro-preview” model for this translation.

A Central Military Commission Built For War — Against The PLA

Wed, 12 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Xi Jinping’s military purges and reorganizations have reinforced his control over the PLA at the expense of its operational capabilities, and the fallout probably will hinder its ability to coordinate strategic force development and large-scale campaigns through 2027. The PLA’s inward turn is a positive factor for regional security in the next several years because it probably will deter Xi from taking unilateral actions likely to lead to war, although it will not stop the PLA from continuing coercive operations short of large-scale conflict.

FYI: Blog entries now mirrored on Substack

Tue, 11 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000

I’ve started publishing my blog entries on Substack. There’s no need to subscribe on Substack if you don’t want to, because I’ll continue publishing on this site, but many people find it easier to find and follow content on Substack.

Another Round of Purges Exposes Political Upheaval in PLA

Mon, 22 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Another bombshell landed in the PLA last week when four more generals who had been absent for months were formally expelled from the legislature. It is a testament to the extraordinary tumult within the PLA that the latest purges made hardly a ripple in English-language media, when in fact they illustrate the depth of disarray engulfing the high command.

Beleaguered organizations suffer new losses…

Two of the four fallen generals come from a perennial source of corruption: the logistics system. Zhang Lin had been head of the CMC Logistics Support Department since 2022 and Gao Daguang was a career political commissar who was most recently Commissar of the Joint Logistics Support Force. Given the decimation of the logistics, procurement, and political commissar systems in the past two years, these two were in especially perilous positions.

Turmoil In The High Command Creates Political And Operational Disruptions

Thu, 17 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000

China’s high command is in the midst of extraordinary upheaval that has deformed command relationships and renewed a climate of fear that will likely be a fixture of civil-military relations under Xi Jinping. Internal investigations began around 2023 within the familiar breeding grounds of military corruption – procurement and logistics – but have spread into the heart of the political discipline system and the head of the command structure, the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Xi's Most Revealing Diplomatic Interaction Was With Justin Trudeau

Tue, 07 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000

[Originally a Bluesky thread.]

Xi Jinping’s single most interesting diplomatic interaction caught on video was with Justin Trudeau at the G20 in 2022. It provides a unique glimpse of Xi’s approach and style in a challenging situation. This was not a favorable setting for Xi and he didn’t want to actually engage, he just wanted to deliver a rebuke.

Obsolete Analytic Paradigms Of Chinese Politics

Tue, 31 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

I think the paradigm for interpreting elite politics that remained influential for too long was the notion that institutions and norms had decisively constrained personal power and channeled political competition within rule-based boundaries. I think it’s striking that Joe Fewsmith titled his book “Rethinking Chinese Politics”, because I think/hope his general approach is the primary way that future analysts understand the subject. But the title reflects the fact that he’d been straining against the tide when it was published in 2021.

Xi's Reading List Is Exaggerated

Sun, 15 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000

[Originally a Bluesky thread.]

There’s a high bar for concluding that a specific work has influenced Xi because there’s so little credible information about his thought process. For example, this op-ed takes official media statements about Xi at face value, when they should instead be thought of as propaganda. (The op-ed was, “This Unreadable Russian Novel Drives Xi’s Struggle Against America.”)

As the piece notes, “What Is To Be Done” is part of the communist canon, and in a canned speech like this, it’s best to read it as Xi alluding to themes like perseverance through hardship rather than revealing a deep insight about his inner beliefs.

What Intelligence Would Be Too Controversial To Give Xi?

Tue, 05 Nov 2024 00:00:00 +0000

What might be a hypothetical, plausible line of intelligence reporting about either the foreign or domestic situation that would be risky to deliver to Xi, because it might anger him or because he might reflexively distrust it?

I myself don’t have any great answers! I think it’s hard because there’s not a lot of information about what specific policy issues Xi feels he is personally responsible for, or questions of fact that he feels strongly about (but which might be wrong)

Counterproductive Information Operations

Wed, 02 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000

This is a fantastic piece by Thomas Rid about self-deception in Russia’s covert influence apparatus.

I think it’s very likely that Chinese online influence operations are subject to the same dynamic he describes: “The SDA’s claims… were read and interpreted by Russian officials and intelligence officers who probably did not understand how public opinion is actually shaped in open societies.”

I think covert pro-PRC online influence campaigns, at least in the US, have been not just ineffective but have actually harmed Beijing’s interests. They continue partly because the organizations involved are probably misjudging their effects. The inherent secrecy and compartmentation involved in these types of campaigns makes it more difficult for top decision makers to get accurate information about their impact and increases the influence of the bureaucracies directly overseeing them. In China’s case this may be exacerbated by a lack of independent oversight mechanisms inside and outside government.

Why Was Defense Minister Dong Jun Left Off The Central Military Commission?

Mon, 19 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Why isn’t Defense Minister Dong Jun a member of the Central Military Commission, like his predecessors? I don’t know but here’s my speculation:

Dong is a different type of appointee than most ministers of defense. For at least the past 20 years, it’s probably been something of a sinecure. Ministers took office at the end of long careers composed of more important roles in the PLA. Some of the old Ministers of Defense were not just members of the CMC, they were CMC Vice Chairmen and Politburo members. When Liang Guanglie was “only” a CMC member in 2008, it was a notable step down for the new minister.

PLA Reorganization and the Cyberspace Force

Fri, 19 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000

[Originally two Twitter threads.]

Hopefully we’ll learn more about the PLA reorganization as more information trickles out about the new arrangements. Some scattered hot takes:

My instinct is that this reorganization was not triggered by any one thing, but reflects the fact that the PLA has struggled for many years to decide how to organize certain critical functions that span multiple domains. This includes cyber operations, other types of intelligence support, and overseeing development of C4ISR architectures. These are inherently tricky questions without clear right or wrong answers.

Brief Thought On Succession Politics

Fri, 29 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000

I belatedly read Neil Thomas’s piece on succession politics, and it’s excellent - highly recommend for anyone interested in what happens after Xi leaves the scene. Two quick thoughts occurred to me while reading:

Scrapping the Premier’s annual press conference reinforces Neil’s point about Xi’s reluctance to do anything that provides even the appearance of a hint about who might be first among equals among his lieutenants.

I strongly agree that the Director of the Central Committee General Office would play a crucial role. It is impossible to appraise Cai Qi’s personal ambitions and relations with other top leaders from the outside, and these would be critical variables in a succession scenario. But simply from the perspective of organizational and bureaucratic power, leading the General Office provides enormous capacity to shape the outcome, especially in a scenario in which Xi was unexpectedly and suddenly incapacitated.

The Political Factors Behind China’s Disappearing Leaders

Fri, 20 Oct 2023 00:00:00 +0000

[This is a copy of the original essay on the Atlantic Council’s blog.]

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has shaken China’s military and foreign affairs establishments in the past two months by abruptly replacing several senior military officers and China’s minister of foreign affairs. The removals were all the more surprising because Xi had promoted many of these same officials to lead their organizations less than a year earlier. A close look at the officials involved suggests that a variety of personal and institutional factors contributed to their downfall, but the disruptive impact of the sudden disappearances indicates underlying mistakes and misjudgments on the part of Xi and the personnel apparatus he oversees.

The Purge of the Rocket Force

Mon, 31 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000

I later wrote a full-length piece about this and related issues here.

Scattered thoughts/speculation on Rocket Force purge:

New Commander Wang Houbin isn’t even an alternate member of the Central Committee, while new Political Commissar Xu Xisheng is a full member. Even PLARF Chief of Staff Sun Jinming, years younger than Wang, is an alternate.
It’s interesting that Wang appears to have had few primary command positions in his recent career, and instead mostly staff officer roles and deputy commander slots.

Balloon Blunder Shows Shortcomings Of China's National Security Apparatus

Tue, 14 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000

[This is a copy of the original essay on the Atlantic Council’s blog.]

Beijing’s decision to fly a reconnaissance balloon over the United States on the eve of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China was a serious error that probably stemmed from both operational miscalculations and bureaucratic shortfalls. Assessments of Beijing’s decisionmaking must be tentative because its internal processes are opaque, but the composition of China’s national security apparatus highlights factors that probably contributed to the misjudgment. These factors suggest that operational planners assumed the United States would not identify the balloon as a Chinese platform and did not intentionally time its approach to coincide with Blinken’s trip.

Brief Thoughts On New CMC Members

Sat, 03 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000

I always enjoy reading Joel Wuthnow’s analysis. This full article is the piece to read on the new CMC. It sparked a couple scattered thoughts as I read:

On He Weidong skipping a grade: after reconfiguration of CMC in 2017, there are very few command-track officers available for promotion to Vice Chair without skipping a grade. Only the Chief of Joint Staff Department is eligible. Theoretically the Defense Minister is too, but they’d have spent the past 5 years languishing in a non-operational role.

Foreign Policy Decisions Aren’t Determined By Beijing's Political Calendar

Wed, 16 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000

[This is a copy of the original essay on the Atlantic Council’s blog.]

Do Chinese leaders really react more strongly to external provocations in the runup to sensitive political events, such as last month’s Twentieth Party Congress or the National People’s Congress scheduled for March?

Milestones like this party congress, party plenums, or even leaders’ informal conclaves at the Beidaihe resort do heighten Beijing’s determination to control domestic narratives and security in advance of these gatherings. Thus, it is logical to assume that this sensitivity also shapes Beijing’s responses to crises and challenges from abroad. But in practice, there is little connection between the timing of these events and the strength of Beijing’s responses to external provocations.

Analyzing Videos Of Hu Jintao's Removal

Thu, 10 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000

Here is my personal overinterpretation of the videos of Hu Jintao’s removal from the Great Hall of the People during the 20th Party Congress, with a focus on the role of other Standing Committee members in the incident:

I think there’s no chance that Xi intended for Hu to be removed or is pleased that it happened. Xi benefits from maintaining a facade of unified support for his decisions, especially those that break with norms. When Xi wants to take down rivals or subject them to public criticism, he stage-manages every detail and emphasizes the trappings of regularized and legal processes. When a target defies Xi’s choreography - like when CMC member Zhang Yang killed himself before trial - they are vilified for it.

Export Controls During the Industrial Revolution

Thu, 03 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000

I was inspired by Greg Allen’s analysis of US export restrictions to China to look up British attempts to control high-tech exports during the industrial revolution. I found David Jeremy’s article on export controls from 1780-1843. Mini-thread with random observations:

What struck me most was the profound difference in state capacity between the UK then and the US now, and how it affects the state’s ability to make export controls “a new strategic asset,” as Jake Sullivan put it. The UK’s customs and security agencies were so inadequate to the task of deterring and catching smugglers that most restrictions were eventually abandoned as unenforceable.

Timeline of Xi's Consolidation of Power

Tue, 25 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000

This front page of People’s Daily demonstrates Xi’s successful consolidation of near-absolute power within the political elite. But it’s not from the 20th Party Congress – it’s five years old! My take on the timeline of Xi’s consolidation of power:

After taking the reins in 2012, Xi spent his first several years on the attack, using mutually reinforcing campaigns to imprison rivals and undercut personal networks and institutions that he didn’t control.

About This Blog

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I’m Mark Parker Young, and this is a personal blog for occasional thoughts about China. All views expressed here are solely my own.

I’m interested in Chinese elite politics, national security, and cybersecurity. I was formerly a Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Most of these blog entries are also published on Substack.

Elsewhere

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

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Thoughts on China

The Trial of Major General Xu Qinxian

A Central Military Commission Built For War — Against The PLA

FYI: Blog entries now mirrored on Substack

Another Round of Purges Exposes Political Upheaval in PLA

Beleaguered organizations suffer new losses…

Turmoil In The High Command Creates Political And Operational Disruptions

Xi's Most Revealing Diplomatic Interaction Was With Justin Trudeau

Obsolete Analytic Paradigms Of Chinese Politics

Xi's Reading List Is Exaggerated

What Intelligence Would Be Too Controversial To Give Xi?

Counterproductive Information Operations

Why Was Defense Minister Dong Jun Left Off The Central Military Commission?

PLA Reorganization and the Cyberspace Force

Brief Thought On Succession Politics

The Political Factors Behind China’s Disappearing Leaders

The Purge of the Rocket Force

Balloon Blunder Shows Shortcomings Of China's National Security Apparatus

Brief Thoughts On New CMC Members

Foreign Policy Decisions Aren’t Determined By Beijing's Political Calendar

Analyzing Videos Of Hu Jintao's Removal

Export Controls During the Industrial Revolution

Timeline of Xi's Consolidation of Power

About This Blog

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